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Abstract 
European banks have been criticized for holding excessive domestic government debt during economic 
downturns, which has been interpreted as indicative evidence of moral suasion. By using a novel bank-
level dataset covering the entire timeline of the eurozone crisis, I first re-confirm that the crisis led to 
the reallocation of sovereign debt from foreign to domestic banks. This reallocation was only visible for 
banks as opposed to other domestic private agents and it cannot be explained by the banks’ risk-shifting 
tendency. In contrast to the recent literature focusing only on sovereign debt, I show that banks’ private 
sector exposures were (at least) equally affected by a rise in home bias. Finally, I propose a new debt 
reallocation channel based on informational frictions and show that crisis-country debt was not only 
reallocated to domestic banks, but also to the informationally closer foreign banks. My results imply 
that informational asymmetries among banks played a key role in the recent fragmentation across.  
Keywords: Current account deficit, Oil price shocks, DSGE models, Search and matching labor market, 
Monetary policy 
JEL Classifications: E32, F32, F45, Q43 
“The same personal and professional ties that may allow sovereigns to apply moral suasion
on domestic banks might also give domestic bankers better information about the likelihood
of sovereign default or repayment.”
Ethan Ilzetzki, in Economic Policy Discussion Panel (2014)
1. Introduction
Can domestic banks act as lightning rods for government bonds in the midst of a finan-
cial storm? On the contrary, by now, the deathly loop between sovereign and bank credit
risks has been very well documented. Increasing risk pressures in the banking sector may
put unnecessary burden on public finances due to potential future bailout costs and nega-
tive spillovers to the lending in real economy. In turn, a spike in the sovereign credit risk
might trigger a deterioration in the banking sector through losses on banks’ government
bond holdings and the loss of credibility for future government support (Acharya, Drechsler,
and Schnabl, 2014). However, despite this adverse feedback mechanism, the link between
governments and their domestic banks may have a silver lining: local banks might have soft
information advantages regarding their clients thanks to their “daily exposure to local news
stories, firsthand knowledge of the local economy, and personal relationships with key people
at the issuing body” (Butler, 2008). During market downturns, such informational advantage
might lead them to act as buyers of last resort absorbing the local assets while (potentially
uninformed) foreign banks shed their exposures in panic. This is especially possible when
markets generally move in a self-fulfillingly pessimistic way ignoring fundamental informa-
tion regarding the solvency of individual countries, as recently illustrated in the context of
the Eurozone crisis (De Grauwe and Ji, 2013; Saka, Fuertes, and Kalotychou, 2015).
In this paper, I present evidence for the latter view. I show that when European banks
retreated from the sovereign debt markets of the crisis countries in the Eurozone, they did less
so for the countries to which they were informationally closer. To put it another way, ceteris
paribus, a bank whose home country had better linkages with a target country (measured
in terms of geographical distance or cross-border banking activities) increased its relative
exposure when that target country was struck by a sovereign debt crisis. This result holds
even among the foreign banks and does not depend on the alternative mechanisms such as
the risk-shifting tendency of the individual bank, the political strength of its home country or
the exchange rate/redenomination risk. Furthermore, the relationship between information
and sovereign risk is much stronger in general terms rather than being specific to the episodes
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of extreme sovereign stress. Hence, I interpret these findings as supportive of the view that
informational asymmetries among banks played a key role in the recent fragmentation across
Eurozone debt markets.
Figure 1 clearly illustrates the puzzling phenomenon that this paper aims to address.
Since early 2010, Eurozone banks have lifted up their home bias for sovereign debt, es-
pecially in crisis countries. That is, at the peak of the government debt problems, banks
started accumulating domestic government bonds. The initial rise and the gradual reversal
of this trend -along with the respective bond spreads- is visible only in periphery part of the
Eurozone. In contrast, the corresponding bias in core Euro countries seems to have been
more or less stable throughout the Eurozone crisis. Intriguingly, the observation still stands
in Figure 2 even after correcting for how much of the domestic debt the banks should hold
in a standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).1
[Insert Figure 1 near here]
[Insert Figure 2 near here]
With the dismal interaction between sovereign and banking crisis in the background,
most of the recent literature attributed this observation to the argument of financial repres-
sion/moral suasion (Becker and Ivashina, 2014; De Marco and Macchiavelli, 2015; Ongena,
Popov, and Van Horen, 2016). In other words, in order to gain relief from crisis and to
be able to rollover their debts, governments may have (implicitly) forced the banks in their
jurisdiction to increase domestic sovereign exposures. Pointing to the highly positive cor-
relations between “government-relatedness”2 and public bond holdings of the banks, these
papers argue that there has been a clear tendency of troubled governments to impose moral
suasion on the banks that they can control. From this perspective, the resulting home bias
has been mostly involuntary for domestic banks and created an unnecessary burden on the
financial health of the banking sectors in crisis countries.
Another competing argument for the repatriation of public debt from non-crisis to crisis
countries is based on the assumption that governments would be less willing to default if
their debt was held by the domestic agents rather than foreign ones due to the costs such a
default would inflict on the domestic economy (Broner, Martin, and Ventura, 2010; Gennaioli,
Martin, and Rossi, 2014b). Hence, in the existence of well-functioning secondary markets,
sovereign debt should naturally be reallocated back to host countries as domestic agents
will attach a higher value to these securities than their foreign counterparts. According to
1As discussed later in the Data section, a simple asset pricing model would predict that banks must
hold sovereign debt in proportion to the relative weight of their sovereign portfolio in the universe of total
sovereign bond holdings.
2Either through direct government ownership of the bank or political links in the board of directors.
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this view, the resulting home bias has been a dark side-effect of secondary bond markets and
might have even benefited the creditors if it eventually decreased governments’ willingness to
default. With respect to this argument, Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of the home bias for
different types of creditors in the Eurozone periphery and core countries. Though it is clear
from Panel A that resident banks in the periphery accumulated a big portion of domestic
sovereign debt, this is hardly true for other non-bank residents in the same countries, which
goes against the intuition of Broner et al. (2010) and asks for a further link between resident
banks and government debt.
[Insert Figure 3 near here]
This paper proposes an alternative channel and shows that European banks’ increasing
sovereign home bias in crisis countries is not so surprising if one takes into account one of
the most conventional (albeit lately-forgotten) theories of the home bias in asset markets:
informational frictions (Brennan and Cao, 1997; Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009;
Dziuda and Mondria, 2012). As true for risky asset classes (e.g. equity), home bias usually
exists when there is an informational advantage in favour of domestic agents. In tranquil
periods and well-integrated markets such as in Europe, one would not expect to observe a
high level of home bias in risk-free sovereign debt.3 Nonetheless, in crisis episodes during
which government debt gets risky, it becomes crucial to have soft information regarding the
true repayment intentions of the government and thus market behaviour might deviate from
publicly observed hard information such as debt/gdp ratios or growth rates of individual
countries. In that case, uninformed foreign banks may naturally rush to exit these markets
in panic, selling most of their exposures to domestic banks at fire-sale prices. Such market
trajectory is indeed compatible with the evidence in De Grauwe and Ji (2013) and Saka
et al. (2015) who detect the apparent disconnection between bond spreads and the publicly
observable hard information (i.e., country fundamentals) during the Eurozone crisis.
By taking a global portfolio approach and using a novel bank-level dataset compiled from
various stress-tests, transparency and capital exercises of the European Banking Authority
(EBA), I first re-confirm that European banks’ home bias increased and sovereign debt was
indeed reallocated from foreign to domestic banks at the peak of the crisis. Consistent
with Acharya and Steffen (2015) and Crosignani (2015), I also find evidence of risk-shifting
behaviour for banks located in crisis countries; however it is also shown that home bias goes
much beyond this behaviour. Interestingly, and in contrast with the secondary market theory
of Broner et al. (2010), this reallocation does not seem to be visible at all for the domestic
3This can be seen in Figure 3 as the average home bias for resident banks in both core and periphery
countries is around 15 percent in early 2009 before it doubles in the periphery at the peak of the crisis.
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agents other than banks. Additionally, I illustrate that, in response to crisis, private forms of
debt (retail and corporate) in bank balance sheets have experienced an equally large (if not
larger) increase in home bias. This finding is not easy to reconcile with the moral suasion
story unless one assumes that, in a sovereign debt turmoil, governments would prioritise
pressuring local banks to buy private sector debt more than that of their own. On the
other hand, this finding is what one would expect from informationally more sensitive assets
(e.g. private debt) if crisis episodes were associated with informational frictions. Finally, I
present a direct information channel and demonstrate that European banks headquartered in
informationally-closer territories have increased their relative exposures to troubled countries.
This effect is robust to controlling for various alternative channels and changing sample
compositions.
Sovereign debt crises in a well-integrated monetary union constitutes an ideal setting
to isolate the effect of information asymmetry on bank behaviour. Avoiding the cross-
country differences in exchange rates, liquidity provision or collateral requirements, this
paper presents evidence that information (or the lack thereof) played a key role in recent
fragmentation across Eurozone debt markets. Thus, revisiting the initial question, it is
possible that domestic banks may have acted as lightning rods collecting the sovereign debt
while governments suffered from informational frictions as foreign banks left the market in
panic, triggering a financial storm. Despite the so-called doom loop between the two, the
relationship between governments and domestic banks may have an underexplored silver
lining.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section briefly outlines the relevant
background literature. Section 3 describes the data. The empirical methodology and results
are presented in section 4. Final section concludes the paper.
2. The Related Literature
2.1. Recent home bias in the Eurozone
The main motivation of the paper comes from the recently-aroused interest in academic and
policy circles on the causes of rising fragmentation -home bias- across Eurozone sovereign
debt markets. One of the earlier contributions by Becker and Ivashina (2014) illustrates
the positive association between country-level government ownership in the banking sector
and domestic government bond holdings of the banks. They further extend this finding
by showing that crisis-country banks with a higher number of government-affiliated board
members hold more government bonds in their balance sheets. De Marco and Macchiavelli
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(2015) follow a similar path to point out that, upon receiving liquidity injections, only
politically-related European banks increased their exposure to domestic sovereign debt. Us-
ing a proprietary bank-level dataset from European Central Bank (ECB), Ongena et al.
(2016) demonstrate that, compared to foreign ones, domestic banks were more inclined to
increase their exposures when governments had to rollover large chunks of outstanding pub-
lic debt. Many other recent papers confirm these observations (Horva´th, Huizinga, and
Ioannidou, 2015; Altavilla, Pagano, and Simonelli, 2016) and conclude that a moral suasion
channel was in operation during Eurozone crisis.4 Nonetheless, none of these studies take into
account the possible information channel that might have been active between governments
and related banks. By constructing an identification strategy based on the heterogeneity
across foreign banks and thus minimising the moral suasion concerns, I contribute to this
literature and illustrate that information was a key determinant in recent sovereign debt
reallocation across European banks.
Another strand of home bias literature specific to sovereign debt underlines the assump-
tion that it is harder for governments to default on their promises when most of the debt is
held domestically. In such a scenario, government would rather choose not to default since
the benefits could be offset by its harm on the domestic economy. Hence, in expectation
of this by local agents, government debt will flow back to the host country during times of
rising sovereign risk (Broner et al., 2010). Analysing a vast database covering 191 countries,
Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi (2014a) show empirical patterns consistent with this prediction
although they cannot differentiate between domestic and foreign bonds at the bank-level. In
a recent paper, Brutti and Saure´ (2016) present confirming evidence in the context of Euro-
zone crisis by demonstrating that reallocation was more intense for sovereign debt than the
private one. Furthermore, debt of the crisis governments tended toward those banks whose
countries were politically more powerful in the Euro area, implying that debt reallocation
was mainly driven to discourage the troubled governments from declaring bankruptcy. By
using a dataset covering the entire Eurozone crisis episode for 30 European countries at the
bank-level, I complement and challenge these findings: I find that reallocation of sovereign
debt indeed occurred in the Eurozone crisis; however this only holds for domestic banks
as opposed to other domestic agents, which goes against the earlier prediction of Broner
et al. (2010). Furthermore, compared to government debt, retail and corporate debt in bank
balance-sheets suffered equally (if not more) from an increase in home bias in response to
crisis, which is hard to reconcile with the earlier finding of Brutti and Saure´ (2016) who only
4These findings are not always consistent though. For example, using the same source of data as in
Ongena et al. (2016), Altavilla et al. (2016) find evidence for moral suasion also in core Eurozone countries,
which ex-post is hard to reconcile with the observation that these countries did not have any difficulty in
rolling over their debts at the time.
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focus on the first part of the Eurozone crisis in their sample period with a limited coverage of
European countries.5 Finally, I find weak evidence for the argument that political strength
of the banks’ home countries mattered in debt reallocation and show that my estimations
are robust to the inclusion of such variables.
A related literature focuses on the risk-shifting tendency of the undercapitalized banks.
According to this argument, banks with low capital ratios prefer high-risk instruments such
as the government bonds of crisis countries so that the shareholders would benefit from a
resurrection of the country while their losses would be limited in case of a default. (Acharya
and Steffen, 2015; Horva´th et al., 2015). However, this argument does not necessarily explain
why weak banks would especially risk-shift by accumulating domestic government bonds
rather than the bonds of other governments struck by crisis. In line with Crosignani (2015),
I find evidence that (potentially weak) banks located in crisis countries shift their sovereign
portfolios more favourably towards other countries in crisis; but this behaviour is found to
be much more prominent when it is the domestic government who is in crisis, indicating
the need for a further investigation of the link between banks and domestic sovereign bond
holdings.
2.2. Home bias in other markets
There are many studies exploring the home bias in portfolio holdings of different asset classes.
Most of this literature focuses on equity holdings (French and Poterba, 1991) whereas others
look at the regional biases in international bond portfolios of various country groups (Lane,
2005). Previous studies mainly revolve around three broad categorical explanations for
home bias: exchange rate risk, transaction costs and informational frictions (Coeurdacier
and Rey, 2013). In the specific context of Europe, with the increasing financial integration
and exchange rate stability over the years, it is reasonable to argue that a more realistic
culprit for the recently sky-rocketing home bias would be the informational asymmetries.
Brennan and Cao (1997), for example, model the sensitivity to asset-related news when
there is a difference between informational endowments of domestic and foreign agents. They
illustrate that, in such a scenario, home bias would be positively associated with the negative
news as foreign investors would try to infer the local information from past asset prices and
react more to such news.6 On a similar path, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009)
5Their sample period goes from 2007 to late-2011 and is mainly restricted to Eurozone countries with
also some non-European countries such as Brazil and Mexico.
6Inspired by Brennan and Cao (1997), there is a stream of studies in the asset-pricing literature that
detect the foreign investors’ trend-following behaviour. See Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999; 2005); Grinblatt
and Keloharju (2000); Froot, Oconnell, and Seasholes (2001); Griffin, Nardari, and Stulz (2004); Richards
(2005).
6
show that, in the existence of (initially small) informational differences, costly information
acquisition process may boost the agents’ home bias. Lastly, Dziuda and Mondria (2012)
demonstrate that, even with sophisticated investors such as investment funds, home bias
may arise due to the fact that investors would be better at judging the performance of fund
managers when they invest in local assets rather than foreign ones. Therefore, one might
observe home bias even in the portfolios of highly sophisticated institutions such as banks
or mutual funds.
Following the intuition that informational frictions might lie behind the widely-observed
home bias for various asset classes,7 many researchers have empirically studied the effects
of several forms of informational-distance on portfolio holdings. For instance, Coval and
Moskowitz (1999, 2001) find that geographical proximity is crucial for US investors’ portfolio
composition and the risk-adjusted returns, even within the same country. Grinblatt and
Keloharju (2001) discover that investors might be biased towards firms that are close to
them in terms of physical location, culture and language of communication. Hau (2001)
exemplifies a case in which professional traders located in Germany or in German-speaking
cities make more profit in German stocks. Finally, Portes and Rey (2005) conclude that
geographical distance matters for cross-border capital flows; however it mostly proxies the
effects of other informational variables such as bank branches across countries or telephone
call traffic. I borrow the informational distance proxies (such as geographical distance and
bank branches) from this literature and contribute to it by extending their evidence to the
scope of Eurozone crisis.
3. Data Description
The main body of data that I use in the paper comes from various stress-tests, trans-
parency and recapitalization exercises that are undertaken by the European Banking Au-
thority (EBA) over the course of 5 years for a large set of European banks covering 30
members of the European Economic Area (EEA). The first of these disclosures was under-
taken by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), which was comprised
of senior representatives of bank supervisory authorities and central banks of the European
Union and later succeeded by the EBA. Its results were made public by national regulators
at the time; however EBA does not provide the related data. Hence, this dataset was ob-
tained from the Peterson Institute for International Economics while all other datasets were
acquired from EBA.
7For further evidence on the informational advantage that domestic investors may hold vis-a`-vis foreign
investors, see Kang and Stulz (1997); Kim and Wei (2002) and Kaufmann, Mehrez, and Schmukler (2005).
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Table 1 lists these exercises and the disclosure dates for each of them together with how
many banks and which information dates were covered. 10 data time-points start from the
first quarter of 2010 and goes all the way to the second quarter of 2015, thus covering the
start, rise and fall of the Eurozone crisis. Sovereign bond holdings are reported for each
data time-point while private credit exposures (corporate, retail, etc.) can be found for 6 of
these. In each disclosure, the full country-breakdown of each bank’s debt portfolio for up to
200 countries can be found.8 However, to focus on the debt reallocation across Europe, only
exposures to 30 EEA countries are included in the sample.
[Insert Table 1 near here]
The main banks involved in the exercises mostly stay the same even though some smaller
banks are added and subtracted from one exercise to another. All exposures are consolidated
at the parent bank level and each exercise involves banks with at least 65% of the total
banking assets in Europe and 50% of the banking sector of each EEA member. Compared to
other studies using proprietary datasets from European Central Bank (Ongena et al., 2016;
Altavilla et al., 2016), EBA data cover banks from a wider range of countries (including non-
Eurozone) and documents finer granularity in terms of full country-breakdowns of sovereign
exposures at bank-level.
I am mainly interested in what portion of a sovereign’s total debt is held by a specific
bank. Thus the main variable of interest (SovereignPortionb,c,t) measures each bank’s (b)
nominal exposure to a certain country (c) at a certain time-point (t) divided by the total
nominal exposure of all the banks for that country at that time. That is;
SovereignPortionb,c,t =
NominalExposureb,c,t∑
b
NominalExposureb,c,t
It is important to note that this measure is independent of the valuation technique used for
the bank-level sovereign exposures as long as all the banks apply the same methodology at a
given point in time, which is the case in my sample as all disclosures are centrally directed and
homogenized by the EBA. This helps me better quantify the relative distribution of sovereign
debt across banks. Furthermore, by construction, SovereignPortionb,c,t does not depend on
the price changes as these are automatically reflected in all banks’ nominal exposures and
thus does not change the particular portion that a specific bank holds out of the total debt.
Therefore, it constitutes an ideal measure to understand the reallocation of sovereign debt
8Except the first disclosure undertaken by CEBS in which only exposures to 30 European countries can
be found.
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over time.9
In line with the mainstream literature on home bias (Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock,
2004; Coeurdacier and Rey, 2013), I also create an alternative variable that takes into account
an optimal portion of sovereign debt that should be held by a bank according to a standard
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This variable (SovereignPortionBiasb,c,t) takes the
difference between our main variable of interest (SovereignPortionb,c,t) and the portion that
is suggested by the CAPM model (SovereignPortionCAPMb,t).
10 As conventional in the
literature, this difference is standardized by the share of other banks’ portfolios in the global
portfolio (1− SovereignPortionCAPMb,t).11 That is;
SovereignPortionBiasb,c,t =
SovereignPortionb,c,t − SovereignPortionCAPMb,t
1− SovereignPortionCAPMb,t
where
SovereignPortionCAPMb,t =
∑
c
NominalExposureb,c,t∑
b,c
NominalExposureb,c,t
If bias variable SovereignPortionBiasb,c,t takes the value of 1, it means all of the coun-
try’s debt is held by the specific bank, thus perfect home bias. If it is zero, that means the
bank holds exactly the portion of the debt suggested by the CAPM model, thus no home
bias. For the later section of the study, I create the corresponding variable for retail expo-
sures (RetailPortionb,c,t) exactly in the same way as described above and then merge it with
the sovereign exposure variable under a single variable name (DebtPortiond,b,c,t) where (d)
denotes the type of debt in consideration.
To construct the dummy variable Crisisc,t, the daily yields of 10-year maturity bonds of
30 European countries are obtained from Datastream.12 In the next step, I follow a similar
approach to Brutti and Saure´ (2016) and categorize a country as “in crisis” (Crisisc,t) if a
9As an alternative dependent variable, I later use sovereign exposures directly in log form [log(1 +
NominalExposureb,c,t)] and confirm that my findings are unchanged. Results are available upon request.
10Notice that CAPM concludes the optimal portion that a bank would hold in an equilibrium setting
should depend only on the size of the bank’s sovereign portfolio and the size of the global sovereign portfolio.
Hence, it does not depend on the specific country of exposure (c).
11In unreported estimations (available upon request), I check my results without this standardization and
show that none of my findings depend on it.
12Bond yields for two countries (Estonia and Liechtenstein) are not available on Datastream; so these
observations are dropped from the sample.
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country is a Euro member and its average daily bond spreads (with respect to Germany) for
the previous three months was above 400 basis points.13
To be able to differentiate between different types of creditors, a measure of sovereign
holdings for non-bank agents is needed. Unfortunately, EBA datasets only contain informa-
tion about banks. Hence, I resort to a country-level dataset compiled from various national
sources by Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012), which lists the portion of a country’s total debt
held by its resident banks and non-bank residents.14 Observations cover 11 European coun-
tries15 at quarterly intervals, starting from 1990s. For consistency, I choose the same period
covered by the EBA dataset, from 2010-Q1 to 2015-Q2. For the panel estimations, I create
a dependent variable called DomesticPortionc,k,t, which measures the portion of a country’s
(c) debt held by a certain domestic creditor (k: ResidentsBanks or OtherResidents) at a
certain time-point (t).
Finally, to proxy the informational linkages across countries, I construct 3 different vari-
ables in line with the previous home bias literature (Portes, Rey, and Oh, 2001; Portes and
Rey, 2005). First one, CrossCountryDistancel,c, measures the geographical distance (in
thousand kilometres) between the capital city of the bank’s home country (l) and the capi-
tal city of the exposure country (c). Second one, CrossCountryBranchesl,c, represents the
total number of bank branches (in thousands) in the exposure country of the bank which
ultimately belong to a bank from its home country.16 Finally, CrossCountryMergersl,c is
the total number of bank mergers (in hundreds) that occurred between the home country
and the exposure country in the years starting from 1985 all the way up to pre-crisis period
(2008) in Europe. Geographical distance information is derived via MapQuest. The snap-
shot of banks’ branch networks as of February, 2016, is acquired from SNL Financial17 while
the merger data come from SDC Platinum.
13Various robustness checks are conducted later by using different crisis definitions (See Section 4.6).
14Importantly for our purposes, ‘other residents’ category does not include the public agencies or central
banks, so we can assume that these are private non-bank parties/institutions.
15These are Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and
United Kingdom. Data for Belgium and Finland can only be found annually; so I linearly interpolated the
data to get quarterly values for these two countries.
16This variable is created by taking all of the ultimate-parent banks located in 30 EEA countries available
in SNL database, independent of whether the bank is included in EBA dataset or not. The purpose here is
to capture the non-time-varying banking linkages across countries. Hence, it is important to consider the full
sample available rather than only the restricted EBA sample (though results do not depend on this). This
data covers 137,284 bank branches in total which is 92% of all bank branches (149,242) in these countries,
estimated using World Bank data for 2014 (see http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.CBK.BRCH.P5).
17Unfortunately, the branch information is not available historically and SNL Financial only provides the
most recent data available. However, to the extent that the current data is representative of the non-time-
varying cross-country banking linkages, it is reasonable to assume that estimates would not be biased in
any particular direction. Additionally, CrossCountryMergersl,c variable overcomes this timing problem by
providing a pre-crisis picture for cross-country banking relationships.
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Table 2 gives summary statistics for these variables. It is important to note that for
SovereignPortion variable, more than half of the observations contain zero values. However,
these are meaningful zeros, implying that the bank does not have any exposure to that
sovereign at that certain point in time. When the mean levels across general and domestic
samples are compared, one can clearly see the inclination of the banks to hold a higher
fraction of the government debt of their own countries. The same can also be said for
retail debt (RetailPortion). When we compare different debt categories for domestic bank
samples, we see that a bank on average holds a higher fraction of its country’s retail debt
(0.164) than it holds its country’s sovereign debt (0.126). This observation is consistent with
the information asymmetry view of home bias, predicting that -in general- informationally
more sensitive assets (private debt) should suffer more from home bias than other more
standardized assets (public debt) would do.
[Insert Table 2 near here]
4. Methodology & Results
4.1. Sovereign home bias during crisis
The first step in my analysis is to capture the effect of crisis on the sovereign home bias
of the European banks. For this purpose, I employ a simple difference-in-differences (DD)
methodology, which assumes that banks’ home bias should share a parallel trend in the
absence of crisis. A simple look at Panel A of Figure 3 confirms the fact that banks’ home
bias in core and periphery countries moved in tandem with each other prior to the Eurozone
crisis. Hence, I go on to estimate the following model:
SovereignPortionl,b,c,t = β1(Crisisc,t×Domesticl,c) + β0Domesticl,c + θb,t + γc,t + εl,b,c,t
(1)
where (l) denotes the home country of the bank, (b) identifies the specific bank, (c) is for
the country of exposure and (t) specifies the time dimension. All variables are constructed
as previously explained in the Data Description section. Controls include a broad set of
fixed-effects at the levels of Bank*Time (θb,t) and ExposureCountry*Time (γc,t). Thus, the
model controls for the overall effects of the crisis both at the home country (since banks
never change their home country) and exposure country levels and Crisis dummy can only
enter the regression in an interaction term. Additionally, Domesticl,c is a dummy variable
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which is equal to 1 if the bank’s headquarters are located in the country of exposure (i.e.,
l=c). In this model, β0 should give us an idea about the general level and significance of the
sovereign home bias in European banks and β1 measures the additional effect of the crisis
on this home bias. Same model is also estimated for the alternative dependent variable with
CAPM adjustment (SovereignPortionBiasl,b,c,t).
Results are presented in Table 3. Columns I-II and V-VI confirm the previous literature
that banks do have home bias in their sovereign debt holdings. It is economically meaningful
as well at a level around 0.126. Given that average sovereign holding in our sample is around
0.01, this finding clearly illustrates that a bank holds a much bigger portion of a country’s
debt when it comes to its own country. Columns III-IV and VII-VIII of the same table
ratifies another observation that is compatible with the previous literature: the sovereign
home bias of domestic banks increases during times of crisis (Gennaioli et al., 2014a; Brutti
and Saure´, 2016). The effect is economically huge: the portion of a country’s debt held
by a representative domestic bank almost doubles in response to crisis.18 Hence, the link
between a sovereign debt crisis and the absorption of government bonds by the domestic
banks is arguably established at this stage. However, with this simple observation, it is not
yet possible to differentiate among alternative channels that may lead to that rising home
bias.
[Insert Table 3 near here]
4.2. Risk-shifting in crisis-country banks
Findings in Table 3 are compatible with information asymmetry, secondary markets or moral
suasion stories of the home bias. One may also argue that banks in crisis countries are
especially weakly-capitalised, which drives them to invest more in their home country bonds
to benefit from shifting the risk onto their creditors (Crosignani, 2015). However, if this is
the case, one would expect these banks to also invest in other high-risk countries.
To check for the risk-shifting tendency of banks located in troubled countries, I estimate
the following model and separate the home bias phenomenon from the risk-shifting story:
SovereignPortionl,b,c,t = β2(Domesticl,c × Crisisc,t × StressedBankl,t)
+ β1(Crisisc,t × StressedBankl,t) + β0Domesticl,c + θb,t + γc,t + εl,b,c,t (2)
18This result is also compatible with the recent bank lending literature showing that, during a financial
crisis, international banks demonstrate a stronger home bias in terms of syndicated loan issuance (Giannetti
and Laeven, 2012) or cut credit less in markets that are geographically close (De Haas and Van Horen, 2013).
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where StressedBankl,t is a dummy variable representing those observations in which the
home country of the bank (l) is considered to be in crisis at a certain time (t). All other
variables are constructed as previously explained. Due to time-varying fixed effects at the
bank and exposure country levels, Crisis and StressedBank dummies can only enter the
regression in interaction with other variables.19
Model 2 checks for risk-shifting behaviour of (potentially weak) banks located in crisis
countries, in line with Crosignani (2015). If the rising home bias in crisis countries is mainly
due to risk-shifting, one should observe a similar tendency of crisis-country banks to shift
their portfolios towards all crisis countries no matter if it is domestic or foreign. This is
captured by β1. On the other hand, β2 measures the additional effect of crisis on domestic
exposures that cannot be explained by the general level of risk-shifting in these crisis-country
banks.
Columns I and III in Table 4 confirm the earlier predictions by showing that crisis-country
banks actually expand their relative exposure to all other crisis countries, potentially risk-
shifting. However, as illustrated in columns II and IV, this behaviour is much heavier for
the home exposures of these banks, thus indicating that risk-shifting may contribute to the
rising home bias in crisis countries but is not even nearly a sufficient explanation. The
magnitude of response to a crisis in home country is more than tenfold higher than that to
a crisis in a foreign country (0.104 vs 0.008). Indeed, banks located in troubled countries
have a special preference for their own government bonds which goes much beyond their
risk-shifting incentives.
[Insert Table 4 near here]
4.3. Bank vs. non-bank domestic creditors
As discussed previously, secondary markets hypothesis states that the increase in banks’
sovereign home bias might be related to the presumption that government bonds would
be more valuable (due to governments being less willing to default) when they are held
domestically. Thus, in the existence of well-functioning secondary markets, debt would
naturally flow from foreign to domestic agents. In addition, if redenomination (Eurozone
break-up) risk was particularly high for crisis countries, this may have pushed up the selling
pressure especially for the foreign investors since they may risk ending up with a currency
19For conciseness, additional two-way interactions of Domestic*Crisis and Domestic*StressedBank are
dropped from the estimation since coefficients are both insignificant and their inclusion does not change the
results in any meaningful way.
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mismatch between their assets and liabilities in case of a crisis country declaring its exit from
the Eurosystem (Battistini, Pagano, and Simonelli, 2014).
However, neither of these channels is specific to banks and, if they were prominent, one
could expect to see a rising home bias not only for domestic banks but also for other types
of agents in crisis countries. Hence, I differentiate the effect of the crisis on the home bias of
different domestic agents operating in the same economy. For this purpose, I use the Bruegel
dataset at country-level and estimate the following model:
DomesticPortionc,k,t = β1(ResidentBanksk × Crisisc,t) + λk,t + γc,t + εc,k,t (3)
where (c) is for the country, (k) is for the creditor type and (t) is for different quarters of
the year. ResidentBanksk is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the creditor (k) of the
country is its resident banks and zero if it is other private non-bank residents. All other
variables are constructed as previously explained. Controls include Creditor*Time (λk,t)
and Country*Time (γc,t) fixed effects, which should absorb all the time-varying country and
creditor characteristics.20 The coefficient of interest is β1, which signals whether or not
domestic banks behaved somewhat differently compared to other domestic agents.
Table 5 compares the responses of two types of domestic agents during crisis. Although
statistically insignificant, Column I indicates that the crisis leads domestic agents to decrease
their home bias on average, which is counter-intuitive with respect to our earlier finding.
However, when I separate the differential response of bank creditors, column II confirms
that resident banks in crisis countries are more likely to increase their home bias whereas
other non-bank residents seem to have moved in the opposite direction. This finding holds
even when time-varying shocks for each creditor are accounted for (columns III-IV) together
with national shocks that may impact both creditors at the same time (column IV). Hence,
this finding goes against the secondary-markets hypothesis arguing that, during crisis times,
government debt should flow back to the home country irrespective of the resident type
since government would then prefer keeping its promise not to harm the domestic economy.
Although it could be argued that governments “care” more about the banking sector and
hence it should be more reasonable that sovereign debt flows to resident banks, one would
still expect to see a somewhat positive response for other non-bank residents as well, which
does not seem to be visible at all in our findings.
[Insert Table 5 near here]
20Notice that with full saturation of fixed effects, ResidentBanks and Crisis dummies can only enter the
regression in interaction form.
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Furthermore, even though the Eurozone could be said to have come to the verge of a
break-up in the midst of the crisis, it is not easy to conclude that redenomination risk was
instrumental in banks’ sovereign exposure behaviour since it does not seem to have affected
other types of investors resident in the same troubled countries. On the other hand, it
is noteworthy that, since different investors may tend towards different kinds of domestic
assets to hedge for the currency risk, the ideal setting to test for the redenomination risk
would be the case in which we could see the creditor decomposition (bank vs non-bank)
of all asset classes rather than only that of sovereign debt. However, in the absence of a
more comprehensive dataset and a legitimate argument for why non-bank residents should
especially avoid hedging via government bonds, it is safe to say that redenomination risk
was not substantial.21
4.4. Sovereign vs. private debt home bias
Most of the recent literature has focused on the European banks’ sovereign home bias al-
though this behaviour might have been just a sub-observation of a more general phenomenon.
Thus, I would also like to compare the effect of the crisis on home bias across various assets
classes held by the European banks. For this purpose, I use a more generalized model as
in the following and differentiate the home bias of two debt types in both normal and crisis
times:
DebtPortiond,l,b,c,t = β3(Sovereignd×Crisisc,t×Domesticl,c)+β2(Crisisc,t×Domesticl,c)
+ β1(Sovereignd ×Domesticl,c) + β0(Retaild ×Domesticl,c)
+ ζd + θb,t + γc,t + εd,l,b,c,t (4)
where Sovereignd and Retaild are dummy variables indicating the respective asset classes.
All other variables are constructed as previously explained.22 The coefficients β1 and β0
should give us an idea about the home bias in these different asset classes in general. β2
reflects the overall effect of the crisis on the home bias for both asset classes and β3 should
tell us if the increase in home bias was stronger for sovereign debt, as would be suggested
by the other competing theories of home bias (moral suasion and secondary market theory).
To get a better sense of whether sovereign debt was the only asset that has suffered from
home bias during crisis, Table 6 draws the following comparison. Columns I and V confirm
21Also see the extra analysis undertaken in Section 4.6 to control for redenomination risk.
22To focus on the main coefficients of interest, the two-way interaction of Sovereign*Crisis is dropped from
the estimation since the coefficient is statistically insignificant and its inclusion does not change the results
in any meaningful way.
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that there is a significant home bias across both assets classes together. When I separate the
home bias for different assets, columns II and VI show that the magnitude of general home
bias for retail debt (0.167) is more than 30 percent higher than the one for sovereign debt
(0.126) and the difference between these two coefficients is statistically significant, which is
perfectly in line with the information asymmetry theory of home bias. Compared to standard
products such as government securities, informationally more sensitive assets such as retail
debt should be held more by the domestic agents who have an advantage in reaching the
relevant information for such assets (Portes et al., 2001; Portes and Rey, 2005).
[Insert Table 6 near here]
The remaining columns in Table 6 provide even more interesting results. Columns III
and VII show that crisis has a positively significant effect on home bias for both asset classes.
Columns IV and VIII shed light on the additional response of the sovereign debt to crisis,
but there seems to be none. At best, this additional effect is negative (-0.026, though not
statistically significant), meaning that it is the retail debt that may suffer more intensely from
home bias in times of crisis. Obviously, this finding is again consistent with the expectation
that, during crisis episodes that are usually associated with rising informational frictions,
informationally sensitive assets should experience a much larger reallocation from foreign to
domestic agents. For robustness, the same analysis is repeated with the corporate debt in
Table A1. Not surprisingly, results are very much in line: in general, European banks have
a higher home bias in their corporate exposures and, compared to sovereign debt, this bias
rises at least equally in response to a crisis in a country.23 Overall, it seems that the recent
sovereign debt reallocation in Europe could be a part of a more general phenomenon (such
as informational frictions) that may have influenced all asset classes simultaneously.
[Insert Table A1 near here]
4.5. Effect of informational distance on banks’ sovereign exposures
It is already well established in the literature that the proximity to the borrower matters
for the banks’ lending behaviour and it usually determines the amount of soft information
that the bank could gather to serve its customers.24 Of course, one could think that the
government bond markets are not necessarily the kind that soft information would matter
23In another unreported robustness check, I repeat the analysis by only including EBA disclosure dates in
which both types of debt exposures were disclosed (6 dates; see Table 1) and find that results are unchanged.
24See, among many others, Mian (2006), Alessandrini, Presbitero, and Zazzaro (2009) and Agarwal and
Hauswald (2010).
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the most. Indicators (such as tax revenue or fiscal balance) showing the strength of gov-
ernment’s ability to pay back its debt are publicly available and easily accessible by market
participants. Nevertheless, an interesting feature of the government debt markets is that,
while corporate bankruptcy is always about the (in)ability of a company to repay, a sovereign
default is -in most cases- a political decision and directly related to the degree of governing
party’s willingness to cut back government spending or increase tax rates. This crucial dif-
ference between corporate and sovereign debt arises due to the lack of a legal mechanism to
enforce repayment on sovereigns (Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer, 2009) and makes
it especially important in times of stress to have insider information on government’s will-
ingness to honour its promises or country’s political capacity to endure further budget cuts.
Such soft information could be obtained via domestic banks’ local/political connections or
simply being more familiar with the country, its daily news and local economic and political
climate.25 In that respect, Butler (2008) illustrates a case in which local investment banks
underwriting municipal bonds have comparative advantage in accessing and assessing soft
information, especially when the bond is risky.
What is then so special about domestic banks over other types of domestic agents? First
of all, domestic banks are the main players in the government debt markets. Figure 3
clearly illustrates that even before the crisis in Euro periphery, domestic banks held almost
as much sovereign debt as that of all other domestic agents combined. This could give
the banks a comparative edge in pricing of government securities.26 Secondly, banks are
natural information-gatherers for their economies. They transact with almost every sector
of the domestic businesses and gain in-advance information on how well the overall economy
may perform over the coming months/quarters, which would have a tremendous effect over
government’s ability to raise tax revenues and pay back its debt. Thirdly, banks are the
agents with the greatest access to liquidity (via central banks) in times of financial crises.
Hence, in a liquidity crunch, governments may find it easier to signal their intentions/plans
to local banks than any other local agent. Last but not least, public ownership in the
banking sector is still more common relative to other sectors, which does not only give the
government a tool to pressure banks, but also opens the possible communication channels
that can transmit crucial soft information during times of sovereign stress (Ilzetzki, 2014).
[Insert Figure 4 near here]
25Here, I interpret familiarity as an accumulated informational advantage rather than a behavioural bias
although the previous literature is somewhat ambiguous on this (see Huberman, 2001).
26Home bias might also arise simply due to domestic banks’ responsibility to act as primary dealers or
market makers in the sovereign debt markets. Ongena et al. (2016) provide contrary evidence that most of
the market makers in periphery countries during crisis were foreign banks and this did not have any effect
on domestic banks’ home bias.
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[Insert Figure 5 near here]
In light of the above discussion, I expect cross-country informational linkages to be im-
portant for the European banks’ sovereign exposures both at home and abroad. Figure 4
pictures the bank branch network in 30 EEA countries and it seems that Eurozone crisis
struck the countries located in the outer sphere of this network, which may have caused these
sovereigns to be especially susceptible to informational frictions. Additionally, larger nodes
in crisis countries imply that their banking sector is dominated by the domestic banks which
might be the reason why debt flew back to these countries in large quantities. Figure 5 with
bank merger network tells more or less the same story. Hence, I go on to formally estimate
the effect of informational distance on European banks’ behaviour towards crisis countries:
SovereignPortionl,b,c,t = β1(CrossCountryDistancel,c × Crisisc,t)
+ θb,t + γc,t + µl,c + εl,b,c,t (5)
where, in addition to the previous ones, I also include fixed effects at the level of interac-
tion between home country and exposure country (µl,c) so that all non-time-varying struc-
tural cross-country linkages could be implicitly controlled. Hence, CrossCountryDistancel,c
only enters the regression in interaction. Alternatively, I use CrossCountryBranchesl,c and
CrossCountryMergersl,c as proxies that would capture the informational channel between
countries.
Table 7 presents the effects of informational distance on banks’ exposures to crisis coun-
tries. First thing to notice is that the explanatory power (adjusted-r-square) of the model
massively increases due to the fixed effects at HomeCountry*ExposureCountry level, im-
plying that cross-country linkages matter substantially for the European banks’ sovereign
portfolios. Although geography could be thought of as a noisy proxy for informational
linkages across countries,27 especially in Europe given the fully open borders and easy trans-
portation, columns I and IV illustrate that physical distance has a significant negative effect
on bank exposures in times of crisis. One standard deviation increase in distance (0.83)
lowers a bank’s sovereign portion holding of a crisis country by almost one percent. Given
that the sample mean of sovereign portion is 0.012 in the full sample, the effect is quite
sizeable and economically meaningful. Similarly, branch and merger connections, which are
better proxies for information, are also significant and positively associated with the banks’
exposures to crisis countries (see columns II-III-V-VI).
27One could also think that distance should be positively associated with asset holdings since more distant
countries would offer better diversification benefits due to the lower correlation in business cycles across
countries (Portes and Rey, 2005).
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[Insert Table 7 near here]
However, full sample in these estimations also contain domestic observations, which are
highly correlated with information variables; and thus may bias the results if there is a
moral suasion or secondary market effect in these domestic observations. Thus, I take a
much more conservative approach and drop all the domestic observations from the sample.
All remaining observations denote the foreign exposures of the banks. Notice that this is a
very conservative approach in the sense that the concept of informational linkages that this
paper has argued for so far has mostly emphasised the link between governments and their
domestic banks. Furthermore, there is the possibility of “reverse moral suasion” on foreign
banks, in which the national regulators may have forced their banks to specifically drop their
exposures to the troubled countries (Ongena et al., 2016). In that case, such pressure would
be most pronounced for better-connected banks which, even before the crisis, may have had
higher exposures to crisis countries. Thus, focusing only on foreign bank observations would
severely underestimate the importance of information channel during crisis.
With the above concerns in mind, columns VII-XII in Table 7 report the results for
foreign-banks sample and show that the effect of geographical distance becomes statistically
indistinguishable from zero, which is not surprising given the noisy nature of this proxy.
On the other hand, branch and merger variables are still influential on the behaviour of
foreign banks towards crisis countries. Although standard errors get relatively larger in the
subsample, magnitude of the coefficients goes up in the meantime. One standard deviation
increase in CrossCountryBranches (1.86) shoots up the sovereign portion by more than
1 percent, which is sizeable given the sample average of 1.2 percent for SovereignPortion.
Corresponding one-standard-deviation effect for the CrossCountryMergers variable is around
0.8 percent, still sizeable but lower than the one for branches. These findings confirm the
main prediction of this paper: European banks located informationally-closer to troubled
countries have relatively increased their exposures to these sovereigns during Eurozone crisis.
One potentially confounding factor might be the possibility that countries struck by crises
may also be better connected to each other. In such a case, information variables may capture
the effect of risk-shifting which was documented in Table 4. To control for this possibility,
I include StressedBank*Crisis interaction as an additional control in Equation 5. Table 8
updates the results with this extra “risk-shifting” control and it turns out to be significant
only in the full sample. Furthermore, none of the previous findings regarding information
effects change in any meaningful way.
[Insert Table 8 near here]
A further criticism might be due to Brutti and Saure´ (2016) who argue that political
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strength of the bank’s home country might be important for sovereign debt reallocation.
Since banks from politically influential countries may feel more confident about enforcing
repayments, they may tend to buy foreign government bonds while others are selling. If
large and politically strong Eurozone countries have also banking systems closely-connnected
to the troubled countries, then I might simply be capturing this political strength effect
rather than the informational-closeness. To incorporate this into my framework, I construct
two alternative control variables that Brutti and Saure´ (2016) propose as a measure of
political strength. One is the share of total Eurozone GDP that the home country of the
bank produces, namely Eurosharel; and second is simply a dummy for the German banks
GermanBankl since Germany has been arguably the most important decision-maker in
Eurozone debt renegotiations until recently.
[Insert Table 9 near here]
[Insert Table 10 near here]
Table 9 and Table 10 report the results with these two variables in addition to the previous
control for risk-shifting. It is clearly evident from both tables that the effect of information
variables does not depend on these alternative channels and robust to controlling for them
in various ways. When it comes to individual controls, they usually have positive coefficients
as expected; however there is no statistical evidence that either risk-shifting or political
strength was instrumental in the sovereign exposures of foreign banks in Europe. Overall,
independent of alternative explanations, findings in this section constitute a direct and strong
evidence for the view that information channel played a key role in the recent sovereign debt
reallocation across Europe.
4.6. Further analysis and policy implications
Eurozone crisis has been characterized by sudden changes in periphery countries’ bond prices
and various policy responses in the face of rising market speculation. Especially the actions
taken by European Central Bank (ECB) seem to have been instrumental in preventing the
self-fulfilling market sentiments (Saka et al., 2015). It is also possible to argue that cheap
financing provided by the ECB to commercial banks in the form of long term refinancing
operations (LTROs) may have led some of these banks to increase their exposures to risky
government bonds. Given that periphery country banks were more likely to be undercap-
italised, this might be the reason behind the rising domestic exposures of those banks to
their own governments. However, this logic skips the fact that there were various countries
in crisis at the same period and cheap financing together with risk-shifting tendency would
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lead these banks to also increase their exposures to other crisis-countries, for which I find
only weak evidence in my data and show that information channel is independent of such
motives.
One further extension of empirical strategy could be to check whether previous results
might be driven by real exchange rate risk. Since my sample includes banks located in
non-Eurozone countries such as HSBC in United Kingdom or Danske Bank in Denmark,
differences in banks’ currency exposures may affect their hedging strategies via government
bonds. To account for this scenario, I construct a subsample composed of only banks head-
quartered in Eurozone countries. Hence, all banks in this subsample use Euro as the main
currency and, given that inflation differences were minimal across European economies dur-
ing my sample period, these banks should on average face similar real exchange rate risks
towards other countries. Table A2 updates all of the main results with this subsample. As
can be clearly seen, there is no material change in any of my previous findings.
[Insert Table A2 near here]
Despite accounting for differences in real exchange rates, one can still argue that there
was a substantial redenomination risk within the Eurozone. As some countries may have
started planning to get out of the monetary union, banks may have optimally started sell-
ing government bonds to hedge against such countries in order to avoid potential currency
mismatches after a Eurozone break-up. However, it is not straightforward to list which coun-
tries actually planned to exit or which countries were perceived by the market as potentially
preparing to exit. Thus, to test whether such motives are important in explaining my results,
I follow a strategy similar to Brutti and Saure´ (2016) and drop from my sample all the bank
exposures towards Greece. It can be easily argued that, if any break-up expectations were
evident during the sample period, this would be especially valid for Greece as it has been the
country that suffered the most from Eurozone crises both economically and politically (Lane,
2012). Therefore, Table A3 presents the results with Eurozone banks, but this time without
any Greek exposures. Again, there does not seem to be any significant change in my main
findings, supporting the notion that they are not driven substantially by the redenomination
risk.
[Insert Table A3 near here]
Another robustness check that comes to mind is to test whether the estimations are
robust to reasonable changes in crisis definition. Table A4 and Table A5 present all the
main results with crisis thresholds of 300 and 500 basis points for bond spreads instead of
my main definition of 400bps. All the main results still hold although, expectedly, they get
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stronger with a lower threshold as this increases the size of crisis-country observations in the
sample and weaker with a higher threshold as this decreases the number of crisis-countries.28
[Insert Table A4 near here]
[Insert Table A5 near here]
Furthermore, choosing an arbitrary threshold for crisis dummy restricts the relationship
between information channel and sovereign risk to be non-linear. That is, we assume that
information channel gets activated only at the peak levels of sovereign stress (i.e., crises).
However, as mentioned earlier, information asymmetry theory of home bias should be appli-
cable for risky assets in more general terms (both in tranquil and stressful times). Hence,
one would expect that even for non-crisis countries, information channel should intensify at
relatively higher levels of sovereign risk. To check for this possibility, I get rid of the crisis
dummy and instead directly use bond spreads in my estimations. Results are illustrated in
Table A6 and strongly support the latter assumption: two-way interaction of CrossCoun-
tryBranches*ExpSpread is statistically significant at 1 percent level in foreign-bank sample
with any combination of controls. This observation supports the intuition that information
matters even for the tranquil countries/times and informationally-closer foreign banks ab-
sorb more of the sovereign debt as the default risk of a country rises in general. On the other
hand, previous literature states that bond spreads may be influenced by factors other than
the default risk, such as market liquidity or inflation expectations. Hence, a less noisy proxy
for the true default probability of the government could be CDS spreads which are less likely
to be affected by such contract-specific or market-specific factors (Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen,
and Singleton, 2011). Therefore, in Table A7, I repeat the same exercise by replacing bond
spreads with CDS rates. All previous predictions, especially the ones on information chan-
nel, are again confirmed and leave no doubt behind regarding the general role information
plays at higher levels sovereign risk.
[Insert Table A6 near here]
[Insert Table A7 near here]
These findings clearly challenge the recent literature of Eurozone studies focusing on the
rising home bias in sovereign debt. One might argue that, in the age of technology and
well-integrated markets such as in Europe, information must be cheap to attain; so huge
asymmetries in the markets should not arise. However, theoretical literature illustrates that
even initially-small differences in informational standings of domestic and foreign agents may
lead them to focus on these differences rather than spending effort to get the information
28Note that Spain and Italy are never in crisis with the higher threshold of 500bps.
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related to foreign assets (Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009). Furthermore, recent
studies on the sovereign credit risk prices in the Eurozone provide evidence that, at the
peak of the crisis, there were great discrepancies between bond yields (or CDS spreads) and
macro fundamentals of the countries in the Euro periphery, which is interpreted as a sign of
market panic (De Grauwe and Ji, 2013; Saka et al., 2015). In such circumstances, it is not
unreasonable to expect domestic or government-related banks to benefit from their superior
informational position and collect sovereign bonds while foreign banks were leaving the debt
markets in rush. In fact, some studies already show that banks that loaded up periphery
country bonds during crisis benefited from this as the crisis pressures eased (Acharya, Eisert,
Eufinger, and Hirsch, 2016b).
Another counter-argument might be that part of the literature shows how increasing
sovereign exposures had negative spillovers on European banks’ private lending, which may
signal that sovereign exposure behaviour was partly involuntary for these banks (Acharya,
Eisert, Eufinger, and Hirsch, 2016a; Altavilla et al., 2016; Popov and Van Horen, 2015).
Still, Broner, Erce, Martin, and Ventura (2014) clearly illustrate that, in the existence of
frictions in financial markets, sovereign exposures may crowd out private lending without
necessarily implying an involuntary or forced behaviour on the part of banks. Additionally,
some recent studies that argue in favour of moral suasion do not find any negative effect of
sovereign exposures on private lending (Ongena et al., 2016).
As a key policy conclusion: if information channel gets active between governments and
domestic banks in the midst of a crisis, this may be considered as a stabilizing force compared
to a situation where even domestic banks would rush out of the market and governments
would find it impossible to rollover their debt. Therefore, the close link between governments
and their domestic banks may create positive externalities in terms of mitigating the effects
of sudden stops and preventing possibly inefficient sovereign defaults. Nevertheless, policy
discussions has so far emphasised shifting the regulatory power from national to suprana-
tional institutions to avoid moral suasion or coming up with various innovations of debt
issuance in order to cut off the diabolic loop between sovereigns and their banks (see Brun-
nermeier, Garicano, Lane, Pagano, Reis, Santos, Thesmar, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Vayanos,
2016). Taken at face value, my results imply that these precautions would not be sufficient
to prevent the rising home bias problem (to the extent that it constitutes a problem) during
crises. Instead further policy discussions may also focus on increasing transparency in the
sovereign debt markets especially in times of crisis or encouraging more cross-border banking
activities to improve informational ties across countries.
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5. Conclusion
Deviating from the growing literature on home bias in European banks’ sovereign debt
portfolios, this paper argues that recent rise in this bias is not a surprising phenomenon if
one takes into account one of the most conventional (albeit lately-forgotten) theories of the
home bias in asset markets: informational asymmetries.
By taking a global portfolio approach and using a novel bank-level dataset compiled from
various stress-tests, transparency and capital exercises of the European Banking Authority
(EBA), I show that home bias increased and sovereign debt was indeed reallocated from
foreign to domestic banks at the peak of the crisis. Though it cannot fully explain the rising
home bias in response to crisis, risk-shifting tendency of crisis-country banks seems to have
a contribution. In contrast with the secondary market theory of sovereign home bias, this
reallocation was not visible at all for the domestic agents other than banks, which is not
incompatible with the information channel of this paper given the relative advantages that
banks enjoy in government bond markets. Additionally, I demonstrate that, in response to
crisis, private forms of debt (retail and corporate) in bank balance sheets have experienced an
equally large (if not larger) jump in home bias than the one observed for public debt, which is
slightly at odds with the moral suasion story unless one assumes that government’s priority
for moral suasion would be on private sector debt during a sovereign debt crisis. On the other
hand, this finding is what one would expect from less transparent assets (such as private
debt) if crisis episodes were associated with informational frictions. Finally, I present a direct
information channel and demonstrate that foreign banks that are informationally better-
linked to crisis countries have relatively increased their exposures during crisis. This effect is
independent of the previous channels proposed in the literature, not driven by exchange rate
or redenomination risk and more strongly exists in general terms rather than being specific
to the episodes of extreme sovereign stress. Hence, this paper mainly contributes to the
extant empirical literature on the role informational asymmetries play in asset markets and
extends it to the context of government bonds and high risk periods.
Taken at face value, my results have direct implications for policymakers. To the extent
that information was at play during recent crises, increasing home bias in bank portfolios may
have been a stabilising force rather than a destabilising one. Despite the well-illustrated ad-
verse mechanism between governments and banks, the possibility that domestic banks acted
as a buyer of last resort may have helped many of the crisis-governments to continue borrow-
ing from the market and service their maturing debt payments. In the absence of a national
central bank acting as a lender of last resort, this may have mitigated the sharp effects of
a sudden stop triggered by foreign banks who potentially had very little soft information
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about the default probability of the governments. In that case, future policy discussions
may benefit from focusing on increasing transparency in the sovereign debt market and en-
couraging cross-border banking activities to mitigate the rising home bias in advance of the
next Eurozone crisis.
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Fig. 1. Home bias in core and periphery Euro countries during crisis. The graph
shows simple country averages of home bias and bond spreads for each country group (core
vs. periphery). Home Bias is defined as the portion of the total sovereign debt of a country
held by its domestic banks. Bond Spreads are computed as the average daily bond spreads
for a country (with respect to Germany) over the 3-month period before each observation
date. Sovereign bond exposure data come from various stress-tests, transparency and re-
capitalization exercises undertaken by the European Banking Authority (EBA) and include
10 observation dates from 2010-Quarter1 to 2015-Quarter2 (see Table 1). Bond yields are
obtained from Datastream. Core (non-crisis) countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany and Netherlands. Periphery (crisis) countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Spain.
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Fig. 2. Home bias (CAPM-adjusted) in core and periphery Euro countries dur-
ing crisis. The graph shows simple country averages of home bias and bond spreads for
each country group (core vs. periphery). Home Bias is defined as the portion of the total
sovereign debt of a country held by its domestic banks, after taking into account the portfolio
size of these domestic banks according to a standard portfolio (CAPM) model (see the Data
Description). Bond Spreads are computed as the average daily bond spreads for a country
(with respect to Germany) over the 3-month period before each observation date. Sovereign
bond exposure data come from various stress-tests, transparency and recapitalization ex-
ercises undertaken by the European Banking Authority (EBA) and include 10 observation
dates from 2010-Quarter1 to 2015-Quarter2 (see Table 1). Bond yields are obtained from
Datastream. Core (non-crisis) countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and
Netherlands. Periphery (crisis) countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain.
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(a) Bank residents and Non-bank residents
(b) Non-residents
Fig. 3. Home bias for bank residents, non-bank residents and non-residents during
crisis. The graph shows simple country averages of home bias separately for bank residents,
non-bank residents and non-residents. Home Bias is defined as the portion of the total
sovereign debt of a country held by a particular creditor group. Sovereign debt exposures
come from the dataset compiled from various national sources by Merler and Pisani-Ferry
(2012) and include quarterly observations from 2005-Quarter1 to 2015-Quarter2. Core (non-
crisis) countries: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and Netherlands. Periphery (crisis)
countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain. Data for Belgium and Finland can only
be found annually; so these data are linearly interpolated in order to obtain quarterly values.
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Fig. 4. Bank branch network across European countries. The graph shows a simple
network map for all the bank branch connections across 30 EEA countries. Crisis countries
(Greece, Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Slovenia and Spain) are in red and others are in
blue. Each arrow represents a connection between two countries with the direction of the
arrow pointing from home country towards the host. Nodes are placed via multidimensional
scaling procedure with a random component and the size of the nodes (own ratio) represents
the percentage of the total branches in a country that belongs to domestic banks. Bank
branch data come from SNL Financial as of February, 2016.
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Fig. 5. Bank merger network across European countries. The graph shows a simple
network map for all the bank merger connections across 30 EEA countries. Crisis countries
(Greece, Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Slovenia and Spain) are in red and others are in
blue. Each arrow represents a connection between two countries with the direction of the
arrow pointing from home country towards the host. Nodes are placed via multidimensional
scaling procedure with a random component and the size of the nodes (own ratio) represents
the percentage of the total mergers in a country that belongs to domestic banks. Bank merger
data come from SDC Platinum and cover the years between 1985 and 2008.
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Table 3: Sovereign debt reallocation across European banks during crisis. The
table summarizes the results of the equation (1) with dependent variables SovereignPortion
(I-IV) and SovereignPortionBias (V-VIII) estimated over a time period fully spanning the
Eurozone crisis on a biannual basis from early 2010 to mid-2015. SovereignPortion is the
portion of the total bank-debt of a sovereign held by a specific bank. SovereignPortionBias
is the portion of total bank-debt of a sovereign held by a specific bank, after adjusting
for a standard CAPM model (see the Data Description section). Domestic is a dummy
variable equal to 1 only if the country of exposure is the same as the home country of the
bank. Crisis is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 only if a Euro country’s bond spread
(with respect to Germany) is above 400 basis points calculated as the average of daily bond
spreads over the 3-month period preceding the observation date. Sovereign bond holding
data come from various exercises of the European Banking Authority (EBA) and country
exposures are included for 30 members of the European Economic Area (EEA). Bond yields
for Crisis dummy are obtained from Datastream. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the bank-level and t-statistics are reported in brackets. ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 4: Sovereign debt reallocation across European banks during crisis: Stressed
Banks. The table summarizes the results of the equation (2) estimated over a time period
fully spanning the Eurozone crisis on a biannual basis from early 2010 to mid-2015. Depen-
dent variables are SovereignPortion (I-II), which is the portion of the total sovereign debt of
a country held by a specific bank, and SovereignPortionBias (III-IV), which is the portion
of total sovereign debt of a country held by a specific bank after adjusting for a standard
CAPM model (see the Data Description section). Domestic is a dummy variable equal to
1 only if the country of exposure is the same as the home country of the bank. Crisis is a
dummy variable which is equal to 1 only if a Euro country’s bond spread (with respect to
Germany) is above 400 basis points calculated as the average of daily bond spreads over the
3-month period preceding the observation date. StressedBank is a dummy variable indicat-
ing those observations in which the home country of the bank is considered to be “in crisis”
(400bps ≤ spread). Sovereign bond holding data come from various exercises of the Euro-
pean Banking Authority (EBA) and country exposures are included for 30 members of the
European Economic Area (EEA). Bond yields for Crisis dummy are obtained from Datas-
tream. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank-level and t-statistics are reported
in brackets. ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table 5: Sovereign debt reallocation during crisis: Resident banks vs non-bank
residents. The table summarizes the results of the equation (3) with dependent variable
DomesticPortion (I-IV), which is the portion of the overall sovereign debt of a country held
by a particular domestic agent (either by resident banks or other private residents), estimated
over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone crisis on a quarterly basis from early 2010
to the mid-2015. ResidentBanks is a dummy variable equal to one only if the creditor is the
resident banks of the country. Crisis is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 only if a Euro
country’s bond spread (with respect to Germany) is above 400 basis points calculated as
the average of daily bond spreads over the 3-month period preceding the observation date.
Domestic sovereign holding data come from the dataset compiled from various national
sources by Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012). Countries include Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom. Bond
yields for Crisis dummy are obtained from Datastream. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the country-level and t-statistics are reported in brackets. ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤
0.01.
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Table A2: Main results with only Eurozone banks. The table summarizes the results of
the equations (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) with dependent variable SovereignPortion estimated
over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone crisis on a biannual basis from early 2010 to
mid-2015. This sample only includes the banks located in the Eurozone. For the definitions
of variables, see Table 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. Robust standard errors are clustered and
t-statistics are reported in brackets. ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table A3: Main results with only Eurozone banks and without Greek exposures.
The table summarizes the results of the equations (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) with dependent
variable SovereignPortion estimated over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone crisis on
a biannual basis from early 2010 to mid-2015. This sample only includes the banks located
in the Eurozone and does not include their Greek exposures. For the definitions of variables,
see Table 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. Robust standard errors are clustered and t-statistics are
reported in brackets. ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table A4: Main results with the crisis threshold of 300 basis points. The table
summarizes the results of the equations (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) with dependent variable
SovereignPortion estimated over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone crisis on a bian-
nual basis from early 2010 to mid-2015. In this sample, Crisis is a dummy variable which
is equal to 1 only if a Euro country’s bond spread (with respect to Germany) is above
300 basis points calculated as the average of daily bond spreads over the 3-month period
preceding the observation date. For the definitions of variables, see Table 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9 and 10. Robust standard errors are clustered and t-statistics are reported in brackets.
∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table A5: Main results with the crisis threshold of 500 basis points. The table
summarizes the results of the equations (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) with dependent variable
SovereignPortion estimated over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone crisis on a bian-
nual basis from early 2010 to mid-2015. In this sample, Crisis is a dummy variable which
is equal to 1 only if a Euro country’s bond spread (with respect to Germany) is above
500 basis points calculated as the average of daily bond spreads over the 3-month period
preceding the observation date. For the definitions of variables, see Table 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
9 and 10. Robust standard errors are clustered and t-statistics are reported in brackets.
∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table A6: Main results with the crisis dummy replaced with bond spreads. The
table summarizes the results of the equations (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) with dependent
variable SovereignPortion estimated over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone crisis
on a biannual basis from early 2010 to mid-2015. In this sample, Crisis dummy is replaced
with ExpSpread measuring the average of exposure country’s daily bond spreads (with respect
to Germany) over the 3-month period preceding the observation date. For the definitions
of variables, see Table 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. Robust standard errors are clustered and
t-statistics are reported in brackets. ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01.
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Table A7: Main results with the crisis dummy replaced with CDS spreads. The
table summarizes the results of the equations (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) with dependent
variable SovereignPortion estimated over a time period fully spanning the Eurozone crisis
on a biannual basis from early 2010 to mid-2015. In this sample, Crisis dummy is replaced
with ExpSpread measuring the average of exposure country’s daily CDS spreads over the
3-month period preceding the observation date. For the definitions of variables, see Table 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. Robust standard errors are clustered and t-statistics are reported in
brackets. ∗p ≤ 0.1, ∗ ∗ p ≤ 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p ≤ 0.01.
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